June 1757 attacks
Colonel George Washington residing in Fort Loudoun Winchester VA pens a letter to Lt Gov Dinwiddie 27 June 1757:
"The enemy have captured
3 children near
12 miles from hence
[meaning from Fort Loudoun Winchester VA]
; &
killed several person[s] near
on the maryland-side.
They attempted to surprize
some people
upon the South-Branch
(where our troops and inhabitants
yet maintain their ground:)
and
are constantly heard and seen about Fort-Cumberland."
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Touch or click on the light blue underlined in quote above to take you to the map.
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See the links and story on each place.
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Founders Online corroborates above from another source:
George Croghan wrote John Armstrong, 28 June 1757:
“Thursday last [23 June]
there were three young Lads taken by the Indians, from a Settlement about 15 Miles this Side of Winchester, and 4 Miles North of Great Waggon Road;
And Friday Evening,
there was one Miller killed Near Henry Paulins, and Two of his Children taken away”
(Pa. Archives, Col. Rec., 7:630–32).
An earlier newspaper account places Cunningham’s fort 5 miles from Mills Gap in the North Mountain (Pennsylvania Gazette [Philadelphia], 13 May 1756). Cunningham may have been Robert Cunningham who had land south of Mill Creek.
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The Big Scare
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These attacks are part of a bigger story.
Earlier this month Maryland's Dagworthy heard intelligence from Indians that a large army of French and Indians were marching with cannon towards Fort Cumberland.
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This caused a big alarm.
GW wrote to everybody to raise a militia to come defend Winchester VA and if possible the South Branch forts and Fort Cumberland.
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The militia came ill prepared and barely armed.
And those who weren't armed would refuse to help work on the building of Fort Loudoun, still going on.
Colonel GW writes from Fort Loudoun Winchester VA on 27 June 1757 to Lt Gov Dinwiddie:
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I think myself under the necessity of informing your Honor, of the odd behaviour of the few Militia that were marched hither from Fairfax, Culpeper, and Prince-William counties. Many of them unarmed, & all without ammunition or provision—Those of Culpeper behaved particularly ill: Out of the hundred that were draughted, seventy-odd arrived here; of which only twenty-five were tolerably armed.
I proposed to the unarm’d, that as they came from home (at least with a shew) of serving their country—and as they were, from the want of arms, incapacitated to defend themselves, much less to annoy the enemy, or afford any protection to the Inhabitants; that they shou’d (during their short stay here) assist in forwarding the public works; for which I offered them 6d. per day extraordinary. But they were deaf to this and every other proposition which had any tendency to the interest of the Service.
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This alarm came right on the heels of Baker's company's capture of some French.
That company also lost their warrior ally in Swallow. He was shot in the head and his son wounded in both thighs.
An epic journey carrying Swallow's son home and marching French prisoners home is retold in this link.
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In the end, the big scare amounted only to the attacks listed at the top of this blog.
And GW sums up that splitting of the large force into scalping parties in that same 27 June 1757 letter:
I have since received various intelligencies
of their appearing at many different parts,
widely distant from each other,
at the same time;
which inclines me to think
that they have detached their principal force
into many scalping-parties.
I have therefore made the best dispositions I cou’d, by posting my small numbers at the most advantageous Posts for obstructing their inroads, and protecting the inhabitants.
We believe the rest of that reported large French and Indian force headed towards Fort Augusta on the Susquehanna River in PA.
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Click on the map site of Fort Augusta for what happened there.
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But, back to the Big Scare.
Douglas Southall Freeman tells this story.
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From Douglas Southall Freeman's Young George Washington, Volume 2, Pages 251-255, published 1948, Charles Scribner's Sons
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Page 251
The return of Baker left only Robert Spotswood and his party afield
Washington was beginning to feel concern for them [59] when, during
the night of the 15th-16th of June, an express rode into town with this
dispatch:
Fort Cumberland June 14, 1757
Sir,
Six Cherokee Indians who just now came from Fort DuQuesne, say that
six days ago they saw a large body of troops march from that garrison with
a number of wagons and a train of artillery, and by their route, must intend
an attack on this garrison
I am, sir, your most humble servant,
Jno Dagworthy [60]
Accompanying this was a letter from James Livingston, Major of the Maryland forces at Fort Cumberland, who explained that the six returning Indians had belonged to Spotswood’s party and had been for some days close to Fort DuQuesne.
They said they had heard a great gun fired near the battlefield of Monongahela The French, according to the Cherokees, had “numbers of wheeled carriages and men innumerable and had marched two days before they quit the Monongahela waters.” Major Livingston took pains to point out that this intelligence came from Indians and that not one white man had brought like information, but he expressed belief that the story was true [61] Washington, too, credited the news [62] which seemed to point to a
larger expedition than the French ever had sent eastward from Fort
DuQuesne. If the information was correct, it probably recorded the doom of Captain Spotswood and his men [63] and it called for immediate consideration by a council of all the commissioned officers then in Winchester — four Captains, two Lieutenants and three Ensigns At 2 a m on the 16th, Washington opened the discussion with two questions* Should the Virginia Regiment proceed at once to the relief of Fort Cumberland, or should the effort be made to assemble a sufficient force to make Fort Loudoun defensible, and to await further orders ? Second, . . . [continue down below to next page]
Footnotes:
59
G W, 61
60
2 Hamilton, 91 A similar dispatch to Governor Sharpe is printed in 31 Md Arch , 227. Dagworthy did not sign with his rank As he had a Major under him, it would be assumed that he was a Lieutenant Colonel in 1757 He held that rank in 1758, but nowhere, w records prior to that year, is he mentioned otherwise than as Captain Dagworthy Perhaps he still had faith
in the magic of rank under the King’s commission. [continue down below to next page]
Footnotes:
61
Ibid, 91-92.
62
2 G W, 6 7, 37 ibid , 478
63
2 G W, 68
Page 252
should the scattered garrisons be concentrated in one fort on the South
Branch, or should all of them be brought to Winchester? [64] The decision, which was made promptly, was shaped in part by the form of the questions Unanimously the council voted to recall the garrisons to Winchester and to hold them there, working on the fort, till more was known about the French advance. [65]
The orders issued by Washington during the next few hours showed that he was acquiring experience Maj Andrew Lewis was directed to undertake a scout at once If he found the French numerous, he was to march the smaller garrisons to Winchester [66] Copies of the messages from Fort Cumberland were forwarded, of course, by express to Governor Dinwiddie, to Governor Sharpe and to Colonel Stanwix [67] Other expresses carried to the County Lieutenants of Fairfax, Prince William and Culpeper a plea that they assemble their militia and move the whole or a part to Winchester without waiting for formal orders from the Governor [68] Washington expected no material re-enforcement from this appeal, 69 but he thought he should make it. Next, he directed that construction of the fort, which had been progressing with slowness, [70] should be pressed by night as well as by day. [71]
When these things had been arranged, Washington sent Dagworthy an account of the steps that had been taken “So,” Washington went on, “. . . I have no doubt that a very considerable force will be with you in a very short time ” Then he added “I have dispatched the bearer to inform you of this, that it may inspirit your garrison I heartily wish you all the success your merit may deserve” — a final remark that Dagworthy may have thought susceptible of two interpretations. [72] [My note to draw your eye in - Sarcasm perhaps? :) ]
For three days thereafter, June 17, 18, 19, if George had further word from Fort Cumberland, it merely repeated rumor and echoed suspense [73] On the 20th, still uncertain, Washington examined with Atkin the French Ensign who had been captured by Baker’s contingent and subsequently had been brought to Winchester along with the Indian scouts of Spotswood’s party The young Frenchman was . . . [continue down below to next page]
Footnotes:
64
Minutes of the council, 2 Hamilton, 94-95
65
Ibid.
66
2 G W , 65-66
67
2 G W , 66; 37 ibid , 478
68
2 G W , 66-67
69
2 G W, 69
70
2 G W, 42
71
2 GW ,66
72
ibid
73
The reason for qualifying this sentence is that the undated fragment of & letter from Major Livingston in 2 Hamilton, 93, suggests that Washington may have received a second express during these three days.
Page 253
clever in diluting deceit with a drop or two of fact and consequently
he did more to confuse than to inform his inquisitors The Indians’
testimony left Washington of opinion that the French were advancing in strength, with howitzers, on the road to Fort Cumberland, but he awaited reports from Lewis, who presumably was now fifty miles in advance. [74]
That same day, June 20, Washington received from one of the Maryland officers an appeal for the services of Indian warriors, who doubtless were to be sent out to scout the trails the French would follow. Washington urged the few savages he could find in Winchester to go to the Potomac, but he might as well have asked the river to reverse its course Each Indian seemed to regard Washington’s request as an attempt to sacrifice him “They positively refused marching,” George had to reply, “until they saw such numbers as would give some probability of success against the formidable force of the enemy." [75] Washington added on his own account, “I have endeavored all in my power to raise the militia, but have only a small prospect for success." [76] It was a strange experience for him to stand in reversed military position, and to be the man to say “No” to entreaties of the same frantic note he had himself so often shaped For once, moreover, he was mistaken about the response of the militia Two Companies from Fairfax arrived on the 21st, the sixth day after he had dispatched his call to the County Lieutenant. [77] Never had the militia done so well. The day prior to their arrival , [78] Washington received a somewhat embarrassed letter from Dagworthy Six other Indians, said the Maryland commander, had arrived from the vicinity of Fort DuQuesne and
had asserted that previous reports of a French advance with artillery
and wagons were untrue. A large scouting party had left the Ohio and
was moving in the direction of Fort Cumberland, but, the veterans admitted, the tale about vehicles and heavy guns was the imagining of badly scared young warriors who had hurried eastward after a glimpse of the enemy. [79]
These more experienced natives of the second party Dagworthy sent to Winchester, along with his explanation, in order that the Virginians might question them Washington did so and concluded that they had not actually been close to Fort DuQuesne, but that they had. [continue down below to next page]
Footnotes
74
2 G W, 68
75
2 G W, 69
76
Ibid
77
2 G W, 70
78
It was written on the 17th and consequently was at least three days on the road.
79
2 Hamilton , 97
Page 254
been on the trail of a considerable force of French and Indians who were moving toward the English settlements These enemies had no artillery, Washington was led to believe, and they were following a route they recently had been employing for all their raids, whether against Virginia, Maryland or Pennsylvania. [80] Dagworthy’s first alarm might have been due, George decided, to the mistakes of an interpreter, [81] but there still was sufficient doubt about the whole expedition to justify the retention for a short time of the militia who were arriving Andrew Lewis was enjoined to be on the alert and to keep all the settlers ready for swift flight, but he was not to abandon the forts on the South Branch until he was certain the French were advancing in that direction. [82]
By the 24th of June, suspense was diminished The half-armed militiamen who arrived with no ammunition, [83] about 170 in the aggregate, were sent on scout [84] or were used to assist in the wheat harvest. [85] In Washington’s estimation, they were, with some exceptions, as worthless as ever. The Culpeper militia who had done fairly well in 1756 now proved refractory Of the 100 who were chosen by lot in that County to march to the Valley, less than eighty arrived Twenty-five only of these were decently armed Few were willing to work on the fort at the additional 6 d a day allowed them by the regulations [88] “No dependence is to be placed upon them,” Washington warned Colonel Stanwix in speaking of the militia generally He repeated his familiar indictment “They are obstinate and perverse, they are often egged on by the officers, who lead them to acts of disobedience, and, when they are ordered to certain posts for the security of stores, or the protection of the inhabitants, will, on a sudden, resolve to leave them, and the united vigilance of their officers cannot prevent them.” 87 Knowing this, Washington was glad to be able to leave the County Lieutenants the discretion of withholding further aid, a discretion of which they of course availed themselves. [88]
Thereafter, Washington observed hopefully the indications that the French and Indians from Fort DuQuesne, on reaching the English settlements, had divided into separate scalping parties, which did com- [continue down below to next page]
Footnotes:
80
2 G W , 70, 71
81
2 G W , 71
82
2 GW 70
83
2 GW, 74-75, 80, 88
84
Cf 2 G W , 76
85
Ibid., 88
86
2 G W , 79 *
87
Letter of July 15, 1757, 2 G W , 97 For Col William Fairfax’s somewhat similar comment on the Fairfax militia, see 2 Hamilton, 130
88
3 G W , 73, 305 Papers of G W , 210, LC
Page 255
-paratively little damage Three children were captured about twelve miles from Winchester, several persons were killed on the Maryland side of the Potomac, [89] at the end of the first week in July there still were tracks and other signs of the presence of hostile savages, but by that time, Washington had been able to send out a party of about thirty Indians to scout m the direction of Fort DuQuesne, and to that extent he recovered the initiative [90] When mid-July arrived he could report, “we are pretty peaceable.” [91]
The contrast between this state of affairs and Dagworthy’s discomfiture in May was not labored by Washington, but it was not overlooked. Writing to John Robinson after the alarm had been proven false, Washington said of Dagworthy “It was a surprising mistake for an officer (in the least degree acquainted with the service) to make.” [92] Again — to Colonel Stanwix apropos of a report from Dagworthy “, I shall not literally believe every account (now) from that quarter, as the last alarming news was founded in so little truth ” [93]
Footnotes
89
2 G W, 77
90
Ibid., 82, 84-85
91
Ibid., 98. Some evidence of Indian activity was reported later in July from Southern Augusta (County) but apparently was not serious (2 GW., 116),
92
Letter of July 10, 1757; 2 GW 86
93
Letter of July 19, 1757; 2 GW 99
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To George Washington from Robert Dinwiddie, 2 September 1757
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I am sorry the Enemy have appear’d on the Branch & of their having kill’d five & captivated eight, this I fear will be the Case by surprizing the poor unguarded People, & Nothing further can be expected than our People being employ’d in Parties searching for the Enemy.
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